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Constitutional Impasse Over Oil And Gas: Is 
Further Decentralization Compatible With 
Nationhood?*
JOSEPH A. GHIZ**
Canada’s federal and provincial governments are in conflict over the 
control of energy resources. The author advocates, in the interest of 
Canadian unity, a strong federal presence in the development of oil 
and gas supplies and a larger federal share of the revenues produced.
To strike a balance between federal and provincial control he suggests 
a measure of provincial ownership of offshore resources and a greater 
role for the provinces in federal decision-making.
Le gouvernement fédérale et les gouvernements provinciaux ont des 
conflits en ce qui concernent le contrôle de l'energie de nos resources. 
L'auteur préconise l'intérêt de l'unité canadienne par une forte prés­
ence fédérale dans le dévélopement des resources d'huile et de gaz et 
une plus grande participation dans les révénues.
SETTING THE BACKDROP
While the debate between resource producing provinces and Ottawa 
rages on, there has been a clear manifestation of a centralist trend in the 
Supreme Court of Canada starting with the B.C. Offshore Reference1 in 
1968 through Caloil2 in 1971 and finally with Cigor and Potash4 within 
the last four years. While the latter three cases can be defended in the 
classical legal m anner by calling in aid stare decisis, the B.C. Offshore 
Reference is an example of the Court acting “unabashedly centralist in it’s 
final upholding o f central government claims as against the provinces.”5 
Indeed it can be argued that the Court descended into the political arena. 
Small wonder that shortly after the decision was handed down, Prime
* This article is the concluding chapter o f a thesis submitted to Professor Paul C. Weiler, Harvard 
University, in satisfaction of the written work requirement for an LL.M. Degree.
**B. Comm. (Dalhousie), LL.B. (Dalhousie), LL.M. (Harvard). Leader of the Liberal Party of P.E.l.
'Reference Re Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights (1968), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 355 (S.C.C.).
Caloil Inc. v. The Attorney-General of Canada (1971), 20 D.L.R. (3d) 472 (S.C.C.).
K.anadian Industrial Gas id Oil Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan (1978), 80 D.L.R. (3d) 499 (S.C.C.).
*Central Canada Potash Co. Ltd. v. Government o f Saskatchewan (1979), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 609 (S.C.C.).
‘McWhinney, “Constitutional particularism and the new, pluralistic federalism,” in Canada Challenged: 
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Minister Trudeau could boldly assert in the House of Commons that the 
principles of the decision “appear to be substantially applicable to the 
east coast as well as the west coast. . . .”.6 And as recently as the National 
Energy program, Ottawa, undoubtedly buoyed by judicial opinion since 
1968, could declare that “It is anxious to refer the matter of ownership 
quickly to the Supreme Court.”7
It has been suggested that the Supreme Court’s centralist trend is 
not in harmony with the political will of Canadians. In referring to Cigol 
and Potash, Richards and Pratt maintain: “For the Supreme Court to 
have adopted such a strategy, independendy of a clear political will 
among Canadians to proceed in that direction, has exacerbated consti­
tutional tensions.”8 The aspirations of the West are not a passing fancy 
but are deeply rooted in the fabric of the region. Similarly, Newfound­
land’s claim, far from being based solely on “black letter” law, arises out 
of a deep attachment to and dependence on the sea. While, according 
to H. B. Nelles, the “main drift of expert analysis of energy policy”9 has 
favored dominant federal action, he has recently raised serious questions 
concerning the ability of the federal government to develop a national 
energy policy.10 Pointing out that since 1944 the federal government has 
conducted at least six surveys o f the energy situation, none of which has 
proved correct, Nelles maintains that the differences among the regions 
call for “policy pluralism, perhaps even competition.”n After all, he 
argues, we have managed “without a national education policy, national 
professional licensing, or national price uniformity in most other impor­
tant things, such as housing, for example.”12
It is against the foregoing backdrop that I articulate my views as to 
the reasons for the necessity of a strong federal presence in the energy 
sector. But before doing so, two matters, the proper role of the Supreme 
Court and the Nelles argum ent, deserve comment.
The Supreme Court
In the absence of a negotiated settlement, lawyers have a natural 
predilection to refer all manner o f disputes to the courts for resolution.
“Lewis & Thompson, Canadian Oil and Gas, vol. 1, 29B. Part I (Butterworth, 1971).
7The National Energy Program (Energy Mines and Resources, Canada, 1980), at 42.
"Richards and Pratt, Prairv Capitalism. (McClelland and Stewart. 1979), at 282.
*Nelles, "The Particular Charm of Canada's National Resources" (unpublished paper presented to the 
University Consortium for Research on North America, December 16, 1980), at 20.
I0H. V. Nelles, “Canadian Energy Policy, 1945-1980: A Federalist Perspective,” in Entering the Eighties:
Canada in Crisis (Carty and Ward, eds., Oxford University Press, 1980), at 91 et set].
"Ibid.
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CONTROL OVER OIL AND GAS 45
In the constitutional area W. R. Lederm an13 has made the point that the 
courts have been influenced by economic and social conditions in the 
resolution of disputes. His view is summed up in the following passage:
As Canada expanded westward geographically and accepted heavy im­
migration, the country became more and not less diverse. T he kind of a 
federal document that history gave us facilitated the development of a carefully 
balanced federalism that accommodated old and new diversities as well as 
ensuring essential unities. Unique flexibility for Canada comes from having 
many power-conferring phrases in competition with one another, and the 
equilibrium points established between them portray the critical detail of 
Canadian federalism. T he power-conferring phrases themselves are given by 
the BNA Act, but the equilibrium points are not to be found there. They 
have necessarily been worked out painstakingly by judicial interpretation and 
precedent over many years. Furthermore, particular equilibrium points are 
not fixed for all time. As conditions in the country genuinely change and 
truly new statutory schemes are enacted, judicial interpretation can adjust and 
refine the powers to meet the new needs. So the high importance of sophis­
ticated judicial interpretation as an ongoing process is obvious.14
If  in Cigol and Potash the Supreme Court may have gone beyond 
judicial interpretation and embroiled itself in a political battle, the ar­
gument that it did so is even stronger in the B.C. Offshore Reference. 
W hether the Court should play an activist role in the development of 
the political psyche of the country is a question that has been hotly 
debated by Lederman and Paul C. W eiler.15 It is beyond the scope of 
this paper to develop the role a final appellate court should play in a 
federal system, but because the key cases in the energy field have a 
political ring about them, the issue should at least be raised and the main 
positions set forth. Professor Weiler eschews judicial interpretation of the 
BNA Act in favor of continuous bargaining and compromise among 
governments. In his view, after one hundred years, the Courts cannot 
get guidance from the words used in the Constitution, and hence, the 
court is developing the rules of the game as it goes along.
Edward McWhinney would also limit the role of the Court, although 
not to the same extent as Weiler. In his view, the Court has a role in 
interpreting the existing legal order, but it should not get involved in 
the “federal-provincial causes celebres and political conflicts of the day.”16
lsI,ederman, "Unity and Diversity in Canadian Federalism: Ideals and Methods o f Moderation” (1976), 
14 Albrrta L  Rev. 34. at 38-39. See also: Scott, “Constitutional Adaptations to Changing Functions of 
Government,” in Essays on the Constitution: Aspects oj Canadian Law and Politics (University o f Toronto 
Press. 1977).
l4Lederman, footnote 13.
“ Weiler, " The Supreme C-ourt o f Canada and Canadian Federalism," in Law and So’ ial Change (Ziegel, 
ed., Osgoode Hall Law School, 1973), at 39-72; See also: Dupre and Weiler, Infra 105, at 462, where the 
authors eschew judicial interpretation in favor of "federal-provincial diplomacy in matters of public 
policy." Professor Weiler's thesis has been attacked by lederm an  in “Unity and Diversity in Canadian
Federalism" cued in this note and again by Lederman in his comment to Prolessor Weiler’s article in 
Imw and Social Change, al 73-78.
1 ‘McWhinney, Supra, footnote 5, al 51.
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In these areas the existing legal order is not involved; rather, we are 
presented with an entirely new or emerging problem outside the legal 
order which requires a political solution. While he doesn’t say so ex­
pressly, it appears that he would place the B.C. Offshore Reference in the 
latter category. The other limitation that McWhinney would place on the 
Court is that it should deny standing to a private individual to call in aid 
the constitution to further a private interest. Absent a major public 
interest, standing should not be accorded plaintiffs such as Cigol and 
Central Canada Potash.17
The Nelles Argument
Nelles’ argum ent is based on a quid pro quo that is divisive o f 
nationhood and unlikely to withstand the test o f time. Valuing the 
principle of equalization, Nelles would transfer jurisdiction in the energy 
field to the provinces in exchange for a provincially funded equalization 
scheme.18 This proposal, in my view, runs counter to the notion of 
nationhood. A citizen should lock to his or her government, whether 
federal or provincial, for a basic modicum of public service, rather than 
to the government of a province with which he or she has no connection. 
A centrally funded scheme was favored in clear and explicit terms by 
the Task Force on Canadian Unity: “It should be clear that we feel the 
central government should have wide responsibility for regional economic 
balance and the broad taxing and spending power to meet it.”19 In 
addition, while the quid pro quo may work financially in Canada’s current 
situation, notwithstanding its divisiveness, there is no guarantee that it 
would continue to work when the pattern of wealth changes again. The 
“have” provinces of another day may balk at paying equalization even in 
the face of constitutional entrenchment. On the other hand, the federal 
government will always remain the government of all Canadians.
Nelles places too much emphasis on past federal failure to predict 
the energy potential of the country and develop a responsive energy 
policy. Hindsight is a great vantage point and it is with the benefit of 
hindsight that Nelles criticizes the federal government. Moreover, as I 
shall develop shortly, the absence of an effective national energy policy 
allowed the provincial governments to create a haphazard and uncoor­
dinated policy primarily responsive to the needs of the United States. I 
agree with Nelles that an energy policy must be responsive to and 
compatible with regional needs. No one that I am aware of has advocated 
an abandonment of provincial jurisdiction in favor of total federal power. 
Rather, what is required is a greater federal presence in the national 
interest. We now turn to see why this is so.
"Ibid., at 53-33.
"Nelles, Supra, footnote 9, at 21. The same argum ent is made by Nelles, in Supra, footnote 10, at 91 
and 111.
'•T he Task Force on Canadian Unity (Minister of Supply and Services, Canada, 1979), at 73.
CONTROL OVER OIL AND GAS 47
THE NEED FOR A STRONG FEDERAL PRESENCE
At least four compelling reasons can be advanced in support of a 
strong federal presence in the oil and gas field. These are: (1) the need 
for a co-ordinated energy policy; (2) the need to provide the federal 
government with the necessary finances to fund equalization; (3) the 
need for one policy on foreign ownership; and (4) the need to ‘‘scout 
against” provincial autarchies. Another reason of questionable economic 
validity, but probably supportable socially and politically, that is advanced 
by the federal government is the need for a “Made in Canada” price for 
oil which is not linked to the world price.20 In the case of natural gas 
the federal government proposes to regulate the price in such a m anner 
as to encourage a movement away from oil in favor of gas.21
A Co-ordinated Energy Policy
Energy policy has a pervasive effect on the whole of the country, 
impacting, both directly and indirectly, on employment not only in the 
energy industry but on virtually every other business endeavor in the 
country. Also, given our northern climate, energy impacts significantly 
on our quality of life. Certainty o f supply is therefore an imperative. 
The problem of ensuring supply goes beyond the oil and gas industry 
and involves electrical, coal and nuclear energy as well as the developing 
future technologies of tidal and solar power.
In a powerful and compelling argum ent for greater federal presence 
in the energy field, Ian McDougall22 illustrates that provincial autonomy 
in energy development has led to an uncoordinated and haphazard policy 
in which provincial development is occurring in response to the needs 
of the American market with little or no regard to the Canadian market. 
He argues that it is in the country’s interest for the federal government 
to assert itself in the energy field at the expense of the provinces. The 
federal government’s National Energy program echoes the concerns of 
McDougall and claims as one of its basic objectives the integration of 
energy policy.23 The supply of energy at a reasonable price represents 
one of the greatest challenges to Canada today. Effective planning is 
needed to utilize and coordinate all sources of energy.
Economic theory teaches us that if each province, reasoning ration­
ally in its own self interest, chooses to adopt policies that further its
*°The National Energy Program, Supra, footnote 7, at 25.
tllbtd.. at 31.
“ McDougall, “Energy and the Future of Federalism: National Harmony or Continental Hegemony?” in
Canada Challenged: The Viability of Confederation, Supra, footnote 5.
t3The National Energy Program. Supra, footnote 7, at 65-68.
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economic objectives without regard to the overall well-being o f the coun­
try, we will end up with a lower standard than would otherwise be 
achieved.24 But Samuel H. Beer25 correcdy maintains that as the regu­
latory process is centralized there must be a greater degree of consent 
and active participation by all in the decision making process. Addition­
ally, “Co-operation — something more than a grudging consent to ‘the 
law’ — is a further necessity.”26 Charles E. Lindblom27 cautions against 
centralized power on efficiency grounds: “For central coordination may 
impose analytic and regulatory tasks on a central authority beyond its 
caj acities.” These considerations, posed by Beer and Lindblom, are the 
basis o f the protestations by the provinces to Ottawa’s control in the 
energy sector. Ottawa’s National Energy program has not yet attained 
the status of being accorded grudging consent by the resource producing 
provinces. They are still “kicking and screaming.” And these provinces 
maintain that on efficiency grounds they are in a better position to 
manage resource policy in a m anner compatible with overall provincial 
needs and aspirations. However, the fact remains that primary provincial 
control in the past has not resulted in an effective energy policy. Mc- 
Dougall aptly demonstrates this fact in the following passages:
T he disposition of Canada’s conventional reserves o f petroleum, natural 
gas, and hydro-electric power-generating capacity illustrates both the cost of 
failing to come to grips with the need to develop and implement an effective 
national policy and the now-urgent necessity o f coming to terms with the 
problem. As a matter of sentiment alone there has never been doubt as to the 
desire of Canadians to keep the country independent and whole. But past 
failure to realize the potential for prosperity has shaken the virtue of the 
federal system in the eyes of many Canadians. It is now time to put federalism 
and the country as a whole back to work, and in this way offer a tangible 
demonstration of its worth to citizens in all its regions.*8
And again:
In almost all these cases, the development initiative came primarily from 
the individual province concerned; federal involvement in the basic decision 
was decidedly peripheral. In almost every case the opportunity to develop 
arose principally from market opportunities in the United States and not in 
Canada.*®
“ This, in a nutshell, is based on a summary of the justification for environmental air quality standards 
in the United Stales. The argum ent, however, is equally applicable in the energy field — or any other 
field — in which independent decision-makers are operating without regard to the common good 
because it is not in their interest to do so: R. B. Steward: "Pyramids of Sacrifice: Problems of Federalism 
in Mandating State Implementation o f National Environmental Policy” (1976-77), 86 Yale L.J. 1196. at 
1211-1213. For the classic account, see Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968). 162 Scterice 
1243.
l5Beer, “New Structures o f Democracy: Britain and America," in Democracy in the Mid-Twentieth Century: 
Problems and Prospects (The Washington Press. 1960), at 47.
l*Ibtd
’’Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (Prentice-Hall. Inc.. 1968).
"McDougall. Supra, footnote 22, at 317.
*»Ibtd., at 329.
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Oil and gas constitute but two sources o f energy for Canada. Devel­
opm ent of these resources must be coordinated with energy development 
in other areas in order to ensure long term security o f supply in Canada. 
Canada’s resources should not be exploited in response to market con­
ditions in the United States. This goal can be accomplished with the 
consent and cooperation o f the provinces by restructuring some of 
Canada’s basic institutions so as to give the provinces a greater role in 
federal decision making power.
Equalization
The increasing wealth of a few provinces plays havoc with the ability 
of the federal government to achieve equalization between the “have” 
and “have not” provinces. The principle of equalization is a basic federal 
goal which is included in the federal government’s proposed constitu­
tional changes. According to Prime Minister T rudeau, equalization cap­
tures “one of the most important elements o f what it means to be a 
Canadian — a willingness to share our good fortune and our opportun­
ities so that we can grow stronger together.”30 Donald V. Smiley31 char­
acterizes equalization as one o f the essentials of a contemporary economic 
nation. He concludes that the inordinate revenue accruing to Alberta has 
played havoc with the equalization system, thus resulting in a diminution 
of full-revenue equalization, “and it is reasonable to expect the increasing 
financial stringency will lead the federal authorities to compromise this 
principle even further.”32 The federal government’s declining capacity to 
fund equalization represents, in Smiley’s view, one of the four manifes­
tations of the decline o f Canadian nationhood.33
The interaction between provincial energy revenues and equalization 
has been put in stark focus by Thomas J. Courchene.34 Courchene’s 
analysis of the 1979-80 fiscal year graphically illustrates the reason for 
the erosion of the equalization principle. Ottawa’s increasing obligation 
to pay for equalization is based, in large part, on the increasing revenues 
accruing to the resource producing provinces without a concomitant
’"Notes for a statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on Equalization. Document 800-14/070, 
Federal-Provincial Conference of First Ministers on the Constitution, Ottawa, September 8-12, 1980
slSmiley. Canada in Question, (3rd ed. McGraw-Hill Rverson, 1980), at 159.
"Ibid., at 254.
3ilbtd., at 253-55. The other manifestations are: (1) the barriers to the free movement of goods and
services throughout the country; (2) the Federal government’s declining capacity to commit Canada in
international relations and the concomitant assertion o f the role o f some of the provinces in this area; 
(3) the increasing emphasis on culture, language, and ethnicity as the foundations for political organi­
zation and allegiance in the country and the lack of emphasis given for (a) the dilemma posed bv the 
neglect of the peripheries (Atlantic Canada and the West) in the development of the country and (b) 
Canada’s relations with the United States.
,4Courchene. “Energy and Equalization." in Energy Polities for the 1980s (special reseanh report of the 
O ntario Economic Council, 1980), at 103 ft seq.
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appreciation of federal revenue. Put otherwise, equalization is based on 
provincial revenue sources and not on the federal government’s intake 
of revenue. The rationale for this method of calculating equalization is 
that the program is designed to ensure that all provinces are able to 
provide “reasonable comparable levels of public services without resorting 
to unduly high levels of taxation.”35 In its pure form, total revenues 
from some twenty-nine provincial revenue sources are equalized to the 
extent that each province’s share of revenue from a particular source is 
guaranteed to be not less than that province’s proportion o f Canada’s 
population. If the total from all sources is positive, a province is entitled 
to equalization; if negative, none is paid.
Since essentially only three provinces, Alberta, Saskatchewan and 
British Columbia, have energy revenues,36 all of the other provinces are 
entitled to an equalization credit from energy sources. In most cases this 
entitlement results in an increase in equalization or the conversion of an 
otherwise “have” province into a “have not” province. As provincial 
energy revenue increases, Ottawa assumes a concomitant obligation to 
pay out more equalization without obtaining the necessary revenues to 
do so. This is undoubtedly one reason why Ottawa is now dem anding a 
greater share of energy rents. Failure to receive additional revenue will 
result in a further dilution of the equalization principle, placing in 
jeopardy Ottawa’s ability to redress economic imbalance among the prov­
inces.
Ottawa has already moved to dilute equalization pursuant to the 
provisions o f the 1977 Fiscal Arrangements Act.37 This Act provides that 
(1) only one-half of all energy royalties would be eligible for equalization; 
and (2) equalization from energy revenues is limited to one-third of total 
equalization from all sources. This latter provision “essentially puts a cap 
on the degree to which equalization payments could be spiralled upwards 
by energy royalties.”38 The Task Force on Canadian Unity has observed 
that “the 50 percent limit introduces an arbitrary element into a formula 
which purports to equalize the per capita national average of virtually 
all provincial revenue sources.”39 The one-third limit, of course, aggra­
vates the arbitrariness.
Another reason justifying Ottawa’s dem and for additional energy 
revenue results from the inequity o f funding the scheme. Put bluntly, 
the energy producing provinces, principally Alberta, are not bearing
" Ib u i. at 105. ■
**Oui o f a total of 4.786 billion dollars, Ontario had one million and Manitoba had 11 million. I have 
ignored these amounts as de mmtmis. These amounts appear at 119 o f Courchene, Supra, footnote 34.
:,7Fedeial-Provincial Fis«al Arrangements and Established Programs Financing Act, 1977, Stats. Can. 
1976-77. Ch. 10. Part I.
'"Supra, footnote 34, at 114.
’’’Thi' Task F iine on Canadian Unity (Minister o f Supply and Services, Canada, 1979), at 73.
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their share o f the equalization program. Courchene has demonstrated 
that for 1979-1980 Alberta had a total o f 4,091 million dollars from 
energy revenue out o f a Canadian total of 4,786 million, but Ottawa was 
only able to collect $107 million from Alberta residents by way of taxes 
to fund that portion of the equalization bill of $889 million attributable 
solely to provincial energy revenue. Ontario, with practically no energy 
revenue, contributed $346 million dollars to fund equalization attribut­
able to energy revenue.40 Courchene’s comment on this inequity: “To 
put it starkly, why should Ontario residents be called upon to contribute 
$346 million each year to pay for equalization that arises because Alberta 
is pocketing $4 billion annually.”41 This imbalance prompted Courchene 
to comment that “the combined principles of cooperative federalism and 
the ability to pay suggest that the producing provinces ought to bear a 
larger portion of equalization flows arising from energy.”42
It should also be noted that Ontario now qualifies as a “have not” 
province strictly because of the energy revenues accruing to Alberta, 
although it has not received any payments.43 A further discussion o f this 
phenomenon is deferred until the discussion on energy pricing.
Foreign Ownership
The federal government argues that it is in the best position to 
control foreign ownership and control of Canadian industry.44 As the 
October 1980 budget and the NEP illustrate, the federal government is 
committed to Canadian ownership and control, and is prepared to go as 
far as penalizing non-Canadian owned and controlled industry. Even 
before the budget Prem ier Lougheed, while extolling the virtues of 
Canadian ownership, criticized what he perceived to be a singling out of 
the oil and gas industry. “What I don’t understand is why this industry 
is being singled out in terms of foreign ownership — why?”45 Notwith­
standing Premier Lougheed’s question, Donald V. Smiley has pointed 
out that federal screening o f foreign investment under the Foreign In­
vestment Review Act has not led to incompatibility between the provinces 
and Ottawa.46 In the oil and gas field this is undoubtedly because the





**Supra, footnote 7, at 16 et seq.
4SAddress by Premier Lougheed, Canadian Daily Newspaper Publishers' Assoc., Toronto, April 16, 
1980, at 10.
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federal government has ignored the problem of foreign ownership; it 
has admitted as much.47 Premier Lougheed’s question does nevertheless 
substantiate Kenneth Norrie’s statement that “the western provinces are 
naturally going to be less interested than the federal government in 
policies to limit the inflow of foreign capital.”48
The federal government now views the problem as one of the export 
of capital rather than its importation. The government through the NEP 
states:
The industry, in addition to maintaining its normal dividend and interest 
payments, supported net capital outflows abroad of $2.1 billion in 1975-79.
Some of these funds represented a return of capital to foreign owners; others 
represented new foreign investments oy Canadian companies. If dividends 
and interest payments are added to this total, the total outflow over the period 
1975-79 becomes approximately $3.7 billion. Dividends rose from $200 million 
a year in 1973 to $600 million in 1979. In addition, the foreign parents have 
received fees for technological, operating and managerial services.49
The question o f foreign ownership o f Canadian industry strikes at 
the heart o f Canadian independence and involves the repulsion o f Amer­
ican continentalist beliefs espoused by Professor Harry Johnston of the 
University of Chicago and George Ball, Undersecretary of State under 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.50 Continentalism today is very differ­
ent than in 1867. One of the motivations for the creation of Canada in 
1867 was the fear of an American invasion. Today continentalism man­
ifests itself “in the deceptive form of American influence upon the 
economy and the cultural life o f Canada.”51 The continentalism espoused 
by George W. Ball is horrifying for anyone who believes in the continued 
sovereignty o f Canada. In a matter-of-fact fashion Ball states that Canada 
“is fighting a rearguard action against. . . the inevitable economic inte­
gration, which will require for its full realization a progressively expand­
ing area of common political decision.”52 Ball sees danger fo: Canada 
and the whole trading world in “the efforts o f successive Canadian 
governments to prevent United States economic domination.”53
47Supra. footnote 7. at 18.
‘"Norrie, "Natural Resources, Economic Development and U. S. - Canada Relations,” in Natural Resources 
in U.S. - Canadian Relations (Beigie 8c Hero, eds., Westview Press, 1980), at 297.
“Supra, footnote 7, at 17.
'•(¿ordon, Sturm Signals New Economic Policies for Canada (McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1975) at 42 and 
‘Ml
“ Wall*. "Survival or Disintegration" in Must Canada Ead? Simeon (ed.) (McClill-Queen’s University Press. 
1977). ai 49
'■'Ball. I hr lh\t iplnu oj Power (Little. Brown and Company, 1968), al 113.
**lhul
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The influence of American companies over the Canadian economy 
with its consequent threat to Canadian independence has been candidly 
made by the following two Canadians. Walter L. Gordon, writing in 1975, 
pointed out that since 1957, when the Royal Commission on Canada’s 
Economic Prospects submitted its final report, there have been four 
inquiries into the question of foreign investment in Canada. All of these 
inquiries concluded that foreign-controlled Canadian companies do not 
operate necessarily in the best interests o f Canada.54
Donald V. Smiley, writing in 1980, stated that: “Along with Quebec 
nationalism and the growing economic strength of the western provinces, 
the influence of multi-national corporations and of the American gov­
ernm ent over the Canadian economy has weakened, and is weakening, 
the capacity of Ottawa to structure and control that economy.”55
The federal government can no longer ignore its responsibility to 
maintain the integrity o f the country; it must assert itself in controlling 
foreign domination of the Canadian economy. It has taken a necessary 
first step in attempting to Canadianize the oil and gas industry, but it 
must be recognized that the problem of foreign ownership goes beyond 
the export of capital to such areas as hiring practices, research and 
development policy, and purchasing policy. In short, foreign owned 
companies may not be advancing the overall well-being of the Canadian 
economy, but are concerned solely with the maximization of profit of 
the multinational conglomerate at the expense of the overall Canadian 
economy.
Provincial Autarchies
Edwin Black and Alan Cairns present an overview of increasing 
provincial dominance in most phases of government.56 Dealing specifi­
cally with resources, they share the concerns of Ian McDougall57 in stating 
that “[A]ll but three of the provinces cover vast land areas whose lavish 
natural resources are exploited at the sole discretion of provincial cabi­
nets.”58 They question whether increased provincial power could move 
us towards “provincial autarchies.”59 While the use of the word autarchy 
may be too strong, it is perhaps just one step removed from the aspira­
tions of those espousing “economic provincialism.” The development of
i4Supra, footnote 50. at 90.
“ Supra, footnote 31, al 273-74.
■'“Black and Cairns. "A Different Perspective on C a n a d ia n  Federalism.” Canadian Federalism: Myth or
Reality* (J. P. Meekison 3rd. ed.. Methuen. 1977), at 398-9.
iJSupra, footnote 22.
"Ibid.. at 42.
’"‘Ibid . at 4H.
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provincial economies in a manner that may be inconsistent with a coor­
dinated energy policy and may frustrate equalization, as well as play 
havoc with Canada’s balance of payments, is not consistent with nation­
hood. The western provinces combined with Newfoundland seek to 
change the direction of the ship of state by according much more power 
and control to the provinces, allowing them to develop in their own way. 
The consensus of academic writing that I have surveyed supports the 
conclusion o f Messrs. Black and Cairns o f the harm  that economic 
provincialism or regionalism can do to Canada. They state: “[W]hile 
speculation is hazardous, the possibility of accentuated economic region­
alism must be scouted and guarded against if the federal system is to 
retain any significant control over its economic future.”60 The incon­
gruency between the increasing sentiment in favor o f “economic prov­
incialism” over “economic nationalism” has been succinctly underlined by 
Garth Stevenson as follows:
The provincial governments, rather than the federal government, tend to 
be the vehicles and the beneficiaries o f  this widespread sentiment, yet it is the 
federal governm ent that is expected to develop and express a Canadian 
position with respect to international resource issues, as well as to defend a 
national interest the very existence o f  which is implicitly denied by much of  
the rhetoric emanating from provincial capitals.®1
A NATIONAL PRICE 
Oil
The Alberta position is to tie the Canadian price of oil to the world 
price. The Canadian government rejects the so-called world price as the 
basis of fixing a Canadian oil price because the world price does not 
reflect market conditions but is based on an effective cartel.63 In the 
federal view world prices are arbitrary and artificial, and Canadians, with 
abundant energy, should not be held ransom to OPEC. Canadians have 
an opportunity for economic development unmolested by the shock waves 
from OPEC. Canadians can, therefore, strive for a price which will 
provide an inducement to continued exploration as well as providing 
revenue to both levels o f government. Further, federal policy ensures 
that, subject to transportation differentials, all Canadians pay the same 
price.64
*'Stevenson, "The Process o f Making Mineral Resource Policy in Canada," in Natural Resources in U.S.- 
Canadtan Relations, supra, footnote 48, at 170.
*3Ibui., at 6-7.; Speech of Honorable Marc LaLonde, House of Commons Debates, Hansard, October 29, 
1980, p. 4237.
*°Supra, footnote 56, at 16.
**Supra, footnote 7, at 5.
"Ibid., at 23.
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While a one-price policy for all Canadians can be justified on the 
grounds of fairness, the federal proposal for a “Made in Canada price" 
that is not linked to world prices has come under attack by G. C. Watkins 
and Kenneth H. Norrie in two recent separate articles.85
Watkins challenges the view that the world price for oil is arbitrary 
and artificial; he maintains that while perfect competition is not present, 
the world price nevertheless does respond to supply and demand and is 
not established in a vacuum. Watkins also maintains that holding down 
the Canadia price below world levels results in excess consumption 
resulting in a net loss to the economy. Moreover, the federal govern­
m ent’s price fixing adversely affects supply, resulting in a further overall 
loss to the economy. Watkins estimates that the total net loss to the 
economy in the year 1984, assuming optimistically no increase in the real 
price o f world oil, will amount to some $3.4 billion.
Norrie not only supports Watkins’ analysis but also rebuts the ar­
guments advanced to defend the federal position. Briefly, he argues that: 
(a) prices are not temporarily high; rather OPEC has demonstrated that 
high prices are a stable phenomenon; (b) low income earners can be 
shielded against high energy prices through the tax system rather than 
a general subsidy on all oil and gas which has a retrogressive effect; (c) 
large windfall gains to foreigners can be mitigated against through 
taxation or other measures; (d) the inflationary aspect of price increase 
is over-exaggerated because gradual changes are more inflationary than 
a sudden change and low prices affect Canada’s self-sufficiency goal thus 
ensuring dramatic price increases; (e) lower oil prices do not provide a 
competitive advantage for Canadian industry because of the small extent 
that energy use (5%) accounts for total industrial costs; (f) industrializa­
tion will not suffer, but rather, a rise in price will decrease dependence 
on foreign oil thus strengthening the Canadian dollar.
These persuasive arguments are a frontal attack on what the authors 
conceive as an irrational oil pricing policy. But the arguments are not 
advanced to repel federal presence in this sector of the economy. The 
federal government can exert a strong measure of control regardless of 
the price. Why then has it opted for a low price? Two reasons can be 
suggested. The first is the stated position of the federal government, the 
second is the reasoned view of Norrie.
Ottawa acknowledges that “(T)here is a broad national consensus 
that oil prices in Canada should rise substantially.”66 But rather than 
relying on purely economic reasons as the basis for its decision for
“ Watkins, ‘‘Mr. LaLonde and The Price Mechanism: Or, Never the Twain Shall Meet"; Norrie. "The 
National Energy Program: A Western Perspective"; both articles in Reaction: The National Energy Program 
(The Frazer Institute, 1981) at 55-73 and 105-124.
**Supra, footnote 7, at 25.
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m oderate price increases, it also relies on political and social reality. 
Ottawa states in the NEP:
It must be remembered, too, that price is only one route to further 
conservation. Societies have strong “structural” rigidities; it is not easy to bring 
about rapid changes in energy use. Entrenched social and economic patterns, 
based on relatively cheap oil, must be modified, but this takes time. Govern­
ments must move on all fronts to create a total environm ent that both 
encourages and allows consumers to cut their energy consumpton. Rapid price 
rises in the absence o f  these other measures could undermine the consum er’s 
ability to make the necessary changes.#T
That the above quoted reasons can be justified has been demon­
strated by Ian McDougall. He argues that energy policy cannot be 
developed in a vacuum but rather the impact on the economy at large 
must be taken into account. He states:
T he situation is straightforward. Canada today, more than ever before, 
needs secondary industrial growth and the employment and income that comes 
with it. T he rate o f  secondary growth is completely dependent upon the 
quantity o f  energy available, and, even more important, on the price at which 
it can be delivered. Energy policy cannot continue to be developed in a 
vacuum divorced from the developm ent consequences for the economy at 
large.88
McDougall does not support his conclusion with calculations, but 
even a 5% increase in production costs may be significant. How many 
plants will be forced to close down with an added 5% in production 
costs? How much unemployment will this create? What are the costs in 
human misery? In speaking to the multifaceted issues involved in striking 
a proper pricing policy, McDougall states:
Given the range o f  considerations to include —  the fair distribution o f  
economic rents between producing and consuming regions, the net effect 
upon per-capita consumer buying power, the implications for primary and 
secondary employment, the structure o f federal and provincial fiscal expend­
itures, and conservation incentives — it would appear that few things could 
be more com plex.89
Lacking the necessary economic background I cannot criticize the 
approach o f Watkins and Norrie, but I am skeptical of relying solely on 
economic theory to establish a proper price for oil. As suggested by 
McDougall the cumulative impact of oil pricing must be considered. Pure 
economic analysis fails to take into account social and political issues that 
can, and perhaps should, be addressed through an oil-pricing policy.
Kenneth Norrie develops what may be another reason for the federal 
policy. When we discussed equalization above we noted the impact of oil
"Ibid., ai 24.
**Supra, footnote 22, at 333.
"Ibid.. at 339.
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revenue on the equalization scheme. Equalization payments are increasing 
as a result of the increased energy revenues accruing to the resource 
producing provinces, principally Alberta. On the other hand Ottawa 
must pay for increased equalization out of its general revenue. We noted 
Ottawa’s inability to continue to fund an equalization scheme on this 
basis. Undoubtedly Ontario is not pleased at seeing its residents supplying 
tax revenues to Ottawa to pay for equalization resulting from Alberta’s 
increased wealth. By holding down the oil price, Ottawa, in effect, 
provides a subsidy to the rest o f Canada at Alberta’s expense. Moreover, 
stricdy speaking, Ontario became a “have not” province commencing with 
the fiscal year 1976-77 and has maintained that status since, although it 
has not received any payments.70 Thomas J. Courchene conjectures that 
Ontario may claim the accumulated amount, which approaches $1 billion, 
shortly.71 However, another suggestion might be that Ontario will not 
submit a claim as long as it receives cheap oil, thus providing it with 
equalization in another fashion. This rather lengthy background brings 
me to Norrie’s point that the payment of equalization out of general 
revenues comes “with consequent budgetary deterioration at great polit­
ical cost. More than anything else perhaps, it is this problem of internal 
distribution of revenues that has prevented the move to a more rational 
pricing system.”72
Ultimately, governmental policy, in a democracy, is tested by the will 
of the people. The 1979 general election was fought on the oil-pricing 
issue. Canadians, as a whole, repudiated higher oil prices. A democracy 
does not always operate in step with pure economic logic. To the extent 
that Ottawa has made a political and social decision in tune with majority 
Canadian opinion, its oil pricing policy can be defended. Indeed, many 
programs of the welfare state would fall in the face of economic analysis.
Gas
Given the current over-supply of gas relative to demand, the federal 
government proposes that gas prices will “rise less quickly than oil prices 
in order to encourage a shift to natural gas.”73 W'atkins is less critical of 
the gas-pricing policy because a lower gas price is consistent with the 
demands of the market place. He questions, however, the wisdom of a 
regulated price over one freely determined in the market place.74 More­
over, Watkins points out that federal policy fixes one price for natural
_ _________________________________________________________________
1 "Supra, tool note 34.
7,Coun hene. "The National Energy Program and Fiscal Federalism: Some Observations," Supra, footnote 
34, at 85.
7,Norrie. Supra, footnote 65, at 109.
13Supra, footnote 7, at 31.
74Watkins. Supra, footnote 65, at 70.
58 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
gas east of Toronto irrespective o f transportation differentials, thereby 
creating “a policy o f price discrimination . . . .”75 Again, a political rejoin­
der is in order. Given the excess of natural gas relative to demand and 
NEP’s desirable goal o f energy self-sufficiency by 1990, Ottawa’s policy 
ensures delivery of natural gas east of Toronto. The National Energy 
Policy is clear in defending this federal policy on political rather than 
economic grounds. It states:
This pricing policy will allow gas marketers to easily penetrate new areas, 
and should lead to rapid increases in gas deliveries through the new pipelines.
T he Government o f  Canada is determined that the new transmission 
system eastward o f Montreal proceed as rapidly as possible. T here should be 
no uncertainty as to the Government’s intentions in this regard. If necessary, 
the Government will take direct action to remove financial bottlenecks, with 
the objective-of making gas available in the Maritimes in 1983.78
I have already indicated my skepticism of developing a pricing policy 
in a vacuum. Through its policy the federal government is attempting to 
insulate Easterners from the harsh financial effects they would face as an 
independent nation. But the east is not a separate nation; as a part of 
Canada it should enjoy its bounty. To the extent that Ottawa’s policy 
serves this otherwise valid goal it can be defended, perhaps not on 
economic grounds, but on political and social grounds.
STRIKING THE BALANCE
While “economic provincialism” must be scouted against, one must 
bear in mind that a federation must balance provincial and regional 
needs, aspirations, and differences against the need for an effective 
central government. Frank Scott’s injunction is worth recalling: “Too 
much centralism invites tyranny, too little creates anarchy.”77
While I am convinced that provincial demands in the oil and gas 
field would denude Ottawa of necessary power to maintain the viability 
of the country, it would be ludicrous for me to attempt to detail the 
specific budgetary measures and other programs necessary to achieve 
meaningful federal control. It should be noted, however, that my argu­
ment for a strong federal presence in the resource field does not amount 
to an endorsem ent of the means through which the federal government 
proposes to assert itself. The fiscal and other ramifications of the NEP 
are well beyond my knowledge. My point is simply that a major federal 
presence is required in the resource sector in order to preserve the
7?Scott, “Centralization and Decentralization in Canadian Federalism." in Essays on the Constitution: Aspects 
of Canadian Law and Politics (University of Toronto Press, 1977) at 279.
lslbtd., at 71.
7*Supra, footnote 7, at 58.
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vitality of the country. It should be noted, however, that the program 
has not received acclaim in the business comm unity.78 Further, the 
financial implications of the program  have come under attack in Reaction: 
The National Energy Program by no less than seven prominent Canadians, 
including Watkins and N orrie.79 M. A. Walker, in the Preface, suggests 
that the program ought to be regarded as a “first d raft” of policy rather 
than “a final immutable statement of it.”80 Walker states that “whatever 
its merits as a political stratagem, the NEP is defective as an economic 
policy, and, if the economic objectives addressed by the policy are to be 
achieved, the energy program must be revised in the light o f the realities 
which, for whatever reason, it failed to probe.”81
But irrespective of the wisdom of this particular program  the federal 
government has a duty to act on behalf of all Canadians in this industry 
which affects all our lives every minute o f the day. But how the balance 
should be struck depends on the exigencies of the moment and on the 
responsibility of the federal government to take account of regional and 
provincial concerns. This much, however, is clear: Ottawa requires not 
only additional revenue, it also requires the necessary power to develop 
a coordinated energy policy and a policy on foreign ownership. To the 
extent that Ottawa asserts itself in these three areas allocational as well 
as distributional power is involved.-It is perhaps unfortunate that the 
price to be paid for a greater measure of central control is not limited 
to revenue sharing but also involves the larger questions of production, 
development and marketing. Indeed, Caloil and Potash are glaring ex­
amples o f federal assertion of power affecting these vital areas. But 
federal assertion o f power by no means precludes a continued provincial 
presence. The interplay between the two levels of government is the stuff 
federalism is made of. The provinces must realize that in the energy 
sector, with its pervasive effect on all Canadians, the federal government 
must have more of a say and this say must come at the expense of, but 
not the preclusion of, provincial power. T here will always be many 
overlapping areas where federal and provincial objectives diverge. While 
it is easy to state that the federal government should prevail in inter­
provincial and international economic development policies, and the 
provinces in their intraprovincial aspects, one must conclude, as did the 
Advisory Committee to the Ontario Government on Confederation, that 
“there will be many gray areas.”82 I agree with the conclusion of the
T'See, for example: "Federal Budget Upsets Industry," in Oilweek, Vol. 31, no. 39 (MacLean-Hunter, 
November 3, 1980) at 3 et seq.; Rowland C. Frazee’s criticism in Globe id Mail, January 27, 1981, at 4. 
The clear implication from these excerpts is that the present energy policy will impact adversely on 
Imperial's investment in Canada.
7*Walker, “Preface," in Reaction: The National Energy Program, Supra, footnote 65 at XI.
*albid., at XII.
'‘'Ibid., at XI.
'*Second Report of the Advisory Committee on Confederation, “The Federal-Provincial Distribution o f Powers” 
(Ontario Government, March 1979), at 24.
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Advisory Committee that “(N)ational economic policy will be the result 
of the combined efforts of federal and provincial development policies. 
For these reasons machinery for continuing coordination and consulta­
tion on these policies is essential,”83 but coordination and consultation 
can only be successful if there is a realization on the part of the provinces 
of the dominant role that Ottawa, in the national interest, must play in 
the oil and gas industry.
On the financial side, no one in the current debate, not even the 
federal government, suggests that the central government should be the 
sole beneficiary of the wealth from oil and gas. It is for this reason that
I can only express bewilderment at the observation made by William 
Moull, in his critique o f Cigol and Potash. Professor Moull states:
A sharing of a part o f  the transitory wealth can be expected, but its total 
absorption and redistribution by the federal government would run counter 
to the historical trend o f interregional Canadian economic development, and 
would be the equivalent o f  a demand that the Western provinces forego their 
prospects for long-term economic growth and resume their former “hinter­
land” status.84
Wrho, it may be fairly asked, has asserted the proposition that the federal 
government should totally absorb and redistribute the wealth from oil 
and gas?
In my view one of the means, in addition to the interplay between 
federal and provincial power, available to protect against “too much 
centralism” is the according to the provinces of a role in federal decision­
making power and ensuring the representation of all provinces in the 
governing party through a system of proportional representation. For 
the moment, in arguing for a strong federal presence, I align myself 
with two other Canadians. Milton Moore asserts that “the economic rents 
from natural resources be treated as a national asset.”85 Donald Creighton 
describes Canada’s natural resources as “the birthright of Canada” for 
all Canadians.86 It is submitted that “economic provincialism” is incom­
patible with nationhood. It would denude Ottawa of power and relegate 
it to “an agency of the provinces”87 ultimately leading to the fracture of 
the nation.
*3lb id
•‘Moull, "Natual Resources: T he O ther Crisis in Canadian Federalism” (1980), 18 Osgood Hall L.J. i, at 
47.
**.Moore, “The Concept o f a Nation and Entitlements to Economic Rents,” in Natural Resource Rn<enues: 
A Test of Federalism (Scott, ed., University o f British Columbia Press., 1976), at 242.
*®Creighten, “Continenlalism and the Birthright o f Canada." in Towards the Discovery of Canada (M at.Vi,"an 
of Canada, 1972), at 287. The federal government uses the words "national patrimony entitlement" in 
referring to the right o f the citizens o f Canada to share in the benefits o f the oil and gas industry : The 
National Energy Program. Supra, footnote 7, at 14.
H7This is Premier Peckford's language. The statement made on the night o f the Quebec Referendum is 
reported in: “MacGregor, Confederation's Bad Boy," Mac Lean's, November 3, 1980, at 30.
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Offshore Ownership: A Compromise
Newfoundland has presented a strong case in logic and equity for 
its claim to offshore ownership. However, in its appeal to the public, it 
has failed to make the strongest argum ent available to it; it should de- 
emphasize the importance of ownership by arguing that even if it suc­
ceeds, the federal government would retain considerable jurisdiction over 
the offshore area. Apart from the power Ottawa enjoys under Section 
91 of the BNA Act, Section 109, which would vest ownership in the 
province, is constrained by Section 117 which accords paramountcy to 
the federal government “to assume any Lands or Public Property re­
quired for Fortifications or the Defence of the Country.”
The example of the United States and Australia demonstrate that a 
measure of provincial offshore ownership and consequent jurisdiction is 
compatible with nationhood. In the words of Attorney-General for Aus­
tralia, “History, common sense and the sheer practicalities make these 
matters for state administration rather than central control, in the absence 
of overriding national or international considerations.”88 As a result of 
the logic of this proposition, the Commonwealth and the States within 
the last year entered into an offshore Constitutional settlement described 
as “A milestone in cooperative federalism.”89 Pursuant to settlement the 
Commonwealth Parliament has agreed to vest in each state proprietary 
rights and title in the seabed of the adjacent territorial sea to a breadth 
of three miles, irrespective of whether Australia moves to a 12-mile 
territorial sea.90
The same considerations led the United States Congress to pass the 
Submerged Lands Act91 in which submerged lands three nautical miles 
seaward of the limit of inland waters were awarded to the coastal state. 
The resolution of the issue in the United States and Australia is a sensible 
one providing a measure of ownership in each level of government, 
allowing the coastal province to administer and control the sea adjacent 
to the coast but reserving the outlying sea to the central government to 
explore and exploit on behalf o f the entire nation.
But Newfoundland does not seek a mere three miles; it lays claim 
to the entire continental shelf, “an area of some 700,000 square miles,
®*Statement by the Commonwealth Attomey-tieneral. Senator the Hon. Peter Durack .C., "Offshore 
Powers a Milestone,” in Offshore constitutional settlement, selected statements and documents, 1978-79 (Australian 
Government Publishing Services, Canberra, 1980).
**Offshore Constitutional Settlement, .A Milestone in Co-Operative Federalism (Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra, 1980).
*'Passed on May 23. 1953.43 U.S.C. 1301-1315.
*°lbtd , at 6-7.
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nearly five times the entire land mass of the Province.”92 In the situation 
off Newfoundland this area extends up to 600 miles in some places.93
Newfoundland’s claim is incongruous with nationhood. The incon­
gruity is made clearer when one observes the enormity o f the concessions 
to be made in favor of coastal states by the proposed Convention on the 
Law of the Sea arising out of the Third Conference on the Law of the 
Sea.94 This convention will fix the breadth of the teritorial sea at 12 
miles.95 It will also establish a region of a breadth o f 200 miles, the 
exclusive economic zone, in which sovereign rights are accorded the 
coastal state for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural 
resources o f the zone. Moreover, jurisdiction will be accorded the coastal 
state in the exclusive economic zone over artificial islands, marine scien­
tific research and the protection and preservation o f the marine environ­
m ent.96 Additionally, the coastal state exercises, in the continental shelf, 
sovereign rights over natural resources.97 For the purposes of the con­
vention, the continental shelf extends a distance of at least 200 miles but 
not more than 350 miles, or 100 nautical miles from the 2500-metre 
isobath, unless there are submarine elevations that are natural compo­
nents of the continental margin.98 It is, from this writer’s perspective, 
unimaginable that the country can survive with coastal provinces exercis­
ing control, albeit shared, over these vast areas of the ocean.
Also, in the event of an eastern coastal province acquiring ownership 
over the resources in the territorial sea or the broader continental shelf, 
Ottawa would be confronted with an intolerable situation on the west 
coast. There could he no justification in denying ownership to one 
province and ac'_oiuii.£ it to another.
•‘This Statistic is Newfoundland's; see: lln ia g e  of the Sea . . . our case on offshore mmeral rights (Government 
of Newfoundland, undated). It should ; Iso be noted that throughout the discussion we have referred 
to “the continental shelf' whereas the .lo re  technically correct term is “the continental margin.” The 
term "continental s h e lf  is referred to in most o f the literature and judicial pronouncements on the 
subject. It is clear, however, that in international law the term “continental shelf comprises the entire 
“continental margin.” The 1958 Geneva Convention on the continental shelf does not fix an outer limit 
to the shelf. The proposed Convention on the law of the sea defines “continental she lf’ as being the 
prolongation o f a state's "land territory to the outer edge o f the continental margin." Draft Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), UN Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP, 10 Rev. 3, August 27, 1980, art. 76.
•3The future of the oceans (Government o f Canada, 1975), at 10.
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In both the United States and Australia the resolution of the coastal 
state offshore question was attained after a determination of legal rights." 
Assuming Ottawa succeeds in the Supreme Court, perhaps an agreement 
can be reached. Evidence of Ottawa’s conciliatory attitude was demon­
strated following the B.C. Offshore Reference. Notwithstanding the decision, 
the Prime Minister in a statement to the House of Commons on Decem­
ber 2, 1978 stated that the federal government intended to proceed by 
negotiation.100 On the sharing o f revenues the Prime Minister stated that 
the federal government is open to suggestions, and, until agreement, the 
provincial share would be held in escrow.101 In a later speech in the 
House of Commons the Prime Minister indicated that one-half of the 
revenues could be placed in a national pool to be distributed by the 
provinces as agreed by them .102
In summary then, what is required in the offshore dispute is an 
agreement that provides a measure of ownership and consequent control 
between the coastal provinces and Ottawa. Given the tough stance being 
taken by Newfoundland, it is unlikely that any agreement can be struck 
until after a determination of the legal issue. If that determination is in 
Canada’s favor it could then seek an agreement along the lines struck in 
the United States and Australia or an agreement based on a sharing of 
revenues. If Canada does not succeed then it would be imperative to 
place British Columbia in the same position as the other provinces and 
it would then become all the more important that Canada have effective 
jurisdictional control over the area. Failing effective jurisdictional control, 
the country will be further weakened and fragmented with the coastal 
provinces exercising ownership and control over vast areas of the ocean 
for provincial purposes without regard for the paramount interest of the 
country.
If the federal government were to vest proprietary rights and title 
in the seabed of the territorial sea to a breadth of three miles in the 
provinces, a degree of decentralizaton of power would be accomplished 
that otherwise would be vested totally in the central government. Another 
area where there is room for decentralization is in the institutions of 
Canada. A greater provincial role in these institutions could be the way 
out of the impasse over the struggle between Ottawa and the provinces 
over legislative jurisdiction. We now turn to this issue.
" I n  the United States in -.United States v. California (1947), 332 U.S. 19,; United States v. Louisiana (1950), 
339 U.S. 699; United Stales v. Texas (1950), 339 U.S. 707. In Australia in; New South Wales and Others v. 
Commonwealth (1975), 8 A.L.R. 1 (High Ct.).
l<M,As reproduced in Lewis and Thompson, Canadian Oil and Gas, Vol. 1, 29B. Part 1, Supra, footnote
6.
'"Ibid.
1 °*Ibid., statement of March 4, 1969.
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An Alternative: Institutional Change
As we have seen, federal assertion of power in the oil and gas field 
strikes at the heart of the west’s grievances with Ottawa and stands in 
the way of Newfoundland’s vision of its future. However, in view of the 
pervasive effects of this industry on all aspects o f Canadian life, in 
addition to the enormity of the area of the continental shelf and the 
need for a coordinated developmental policy, there can be no substitute 
for a strong federal presence in this industry. Further, this writer shares 
the view that Canada is one of the most decentralized federations in the 
world.103 To further decentralize the country, in the name of unity, by 
the devolution to the provinces o f more legislative power in the resource 
sector would lead to the disunity of the country. In addition, if ownership 
rights over the entire continental shelf are vested in the provinces, the 
degree of decentralization becomes even more acute. Yet one is left with 
the observation that “most close observers of Canadian federalism would 
agree with the Task Force on Canadian Unity that a more decentralized 
federation is inevitable.”104
But decentralization does not have to come at the expense of federal 
power and ownership rights. Canada, by according to the provinces 
greater input into federal decision-making, can have greater decentrali­
zation without denuding the federal government of legislative power and 
ownership rights. Interestingly enough this is the view taken by Alterna­
tives,,105 in its paper prepared for the Canada West Foundation. Its 
authors argue that central government institutions and structures require 
change rather than a reordering of the division of powers.106 As far as 
the division of powers is concerned: “Canada strikes a fair balance 
between regional variability and flexibility on the one hand, and national 
stabilization and flexibility on the oth^r.”107 And again, “in terms of the 
actual division of powers and functions, Canada is possibly one of the 
world’s best examples of a functioning federal system.”108 The authors 
reach this conclusion fully cognizant of the energy crisis and the issue of 
natural resources.109
l0SForsey, The "Third Option" (1979), 57 Can. Bar Rei’. 472. at 485; Weiler, “Confederation Discontents 
and Constitutional Reform: The Case of the Second Chamber" (1979), 29 U. Toronto L.J. 253, at 258.
l#4Dupre and Weiler. “Reflections o f the Task Force on Canadian Unity” (1979), 57 Can. Bar Rev. 446. 
at 466.
l01F.lton, Fngelman and McCormick. Alternatives: Towards the Drxflopmmt of an Effective Federal System for 
Canada, A Reitsion o f a Discussion Paper Prepared for the Canadian West Foundation (1978).
,0*The central government institutions dealt with in Alternatiiies are the Upper House and the Supreme 
Court.
l01Supra, footnote 165, at 8.
I0H/M  . at 11. The authors do argue, however, for areas of greater concurrency which, they state, would 
merely recognize reality. They also make a cast* for Provincial indirect taxation and the repeal of the 
federal disallowance power.
'°*lbtd.. at 3.
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Institutional change has also been proposed by the Task Force on 
Canadian Unity110 and the Canadian Bar Association’s Committee on the 
Constitution.111 Without engaging in detail, both o f these reports support 
the abolition of the present Senate to be replaced by an U pper House 
whose members would represent the provinces, thus ensuring a provincial 
voice in federal decision making irrespective of the make up of the 
House o f Commons. Also, both would have provincial involvement in 
the selection o f members of the Supreme Court in order to remove the 
perceived federal bias of Judges appointed by the federal government 
without provincial involvement. The Task Force also proposes a modifi­
cation of the present mode of election to the House of Commons by 
introducing an element o f proportionality to complement the present 
simple-majority representation. This method of election would ensure 
that all provinces would have a degree of representation in the federal 
governing party.112
The failure o f the September 1980 First Ministers’ Conference in 
achieving agreement is evidence that the trade-off o f institutional change 
for federal power over resources is not acceptable to the provinces. 
However, given a federal assertion of power such as the October 1980 
budget and the national energy program, and given a Supreme Court 
that is upholding federal power over the oil and gas industry, the 
provinces may well opt for this measure of input and control rather than 
the route of separation.
While institutional change may provide the basis for a reluctant 
compromise with the resource producing provinces, other issues are 
involved in the coun try ’s com m itm ent to Q uebec for constitutional 
change.113 This is the subject presently being addressed by the Trudeau 
government in its proposed resolution to amend the Constitution by 
providing for patriation with an amending formula, a charter of rights 
and the entrenchm ent o f the principle of equalization. However, as
ll#T he I'ask Force on Canadian Unitv. A Future Together: Observations and Recommendation. Supra, footnote
39.
" 'C anad ian  Bar Association Committee of the Constitution. Towards a New Canada, (Canadian Bar 
Foundation, 1978).
" ’For a critique o f the Task Force Report, see: Dupre and Weiler. “A sense of Proportion and a Sense 
o f Priorities." Supra, footnote 104. Messrs. Dupre and Weiler do. however, support a svstem of 
proportional representation.
" sThis commitment was made by Canadians during the Quebec Referendum and has been summed 
up bv the Prime Minister as follows: This past spring, when Quebecers were urged bv their provincial 
government to separate from Canada, people in all parts of the country confirmed the bargain, the 
social contract, which made Confederation p*«sible: the promise that all can share tull\ in Canada's 
heritage.
The Canadian Government's commitment was clear. So was the commitment ol all national partv leaders 
and of each of the Premiers. H undreds o f thousands of individual Canadians signed pennons; schools, 
churches, and city councils declared themselves
Statement b\ th e  Prime Minister on the Canadian Constitution Ottawa. (><toher 2. 1980. at b-7
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inviting as the issues presented by the present debate in this area might 
be, they are clearly outside the scope of this paper.
CONCLUSION
Canada is at a crossroads in the field of energy regulation. Starkly 
put, the nation is on the horns of a dilemma as to which course to take 
in the future development o f and control over oil and gas resources. 
The choices to be made are not easy ones but ones which must never­
theless be made. The easy solution to the nation’s problems in this area 
is to strike a course somewhere between the two extremes through the 
process of bargaining and compromise. However, because of the seem­
ingly intransigent positions adopted by the combatants, it seems unlikely 
that a negotiated solution will be found. At issue is the balance of power 
between Ottawa and the provinces. There can be no question but that 
the increase in economic rents available from the oil and gas sector has 
vaulted the dispute into center stage in the constitutional wrangling 
between Ottawa and the provinces.
As we have seen, the current dispute turns essentially on the sharing 
of revenue. In this regard I have argued that the resource producing 
provinces have benefitted inordinately at the expense o f Ottawa. Ottawa 
must have a greater share of the rents from this resource in order to 
fulfill its mandate to all Canadians. The inability of the parties to agree 
has resulted in necessary but discordant litigation. Ultimately, the Su­
preme Court is called upon to settle differences; whatever the result in 
the ensuing litigation, the political balance of power is affected. But when 
the disputants are unable to resolve their differences, there is no other 
recourse than adjudication by an “independent” tribunal.
On the legal front, we see a centralist Supreme Court maintaining 
federal power. Unfortunately, in the process, the Supreme Court may 
have descended into the political arena. While the Court can be criticized 
for playing an activist role in the resolution of disputes between the 
provinces and Ottawa, I am of the view that the decisions rendered by 
the Court will be seen, in the long run, as a contribution to the mainte­
nance o f the integrity o f the country. The provincial dem ands are 
admittedly, at least in the case of Alberta and Newfoundland, aimed at 
altering the nature of Canadian Federalism by creating provinces with 
superwealth and all the power that wealth commands. The aggrandize­
ment of provincial wealth and power is to be achieved by denying that 
wealth and power to Ottawa. This can only have a crippling effect on 
Ottawa’s ability to manage the country.
W'hile the specter o f western separation has been raised, one cannot 
ignore the countervailing argum ent that the accumulation of wealth and 
power ill the hands o f one province, or in more than one province, could
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underm ine confederation. Premier William Davis, in referring to Alber­
ta’s loans to other provinces, has stated that there is “something a little 
out of whack” when one province lends money to other provinces. “You 
don’t see that anywhere else in the world.”114 The Globe fcf M ail reports 
that “some Q ueen’s Park officials believe that in making the loans Alberta 
has to some extent adopted the role of central banker, a function that is 
properly the preserve o f the federal government”115.
This paper has suggested a more balanced approach to oil and gas 
development which would allow Ottawa to raise needed revenues in 
order to maintain the national programs necessary to ensure a basic 
modicum of living standards throughout the country, and which would 
allow the central government to develop an overall consistent energy 
program, rather than the haphazard and uncoordinated approach of 
provincial development consistent only with provincial concerns and 
aspirations.
In the event that the resource producing provinces fail to voluntarily 
accord this measure of power to the central government, then Ottawa 
must assert itself in a unilateral fashion for the good of the country. 
There is, of course, no question that a negotiated settlement is far better 
than the utilization of the arsenal available to Ottawa. But when there is 
an impasse in an area that is so vitally fundamental to the country as a 
whole, it is time to pull out the stops and get on with the job. To those 
who argue that this is in itself divisive, my answer is that it is time to test 
the will of westerners and Newfoundlanders. Have them declare them ­
selves for a better Canada or for a nation fractured not only geographically, 
culturally, and linguistically, but also split between the rich and the poor, 
leaving the latter to the mercy of a province or provinces with which 
they have no connection.
n *Globf & Mail, December 22, 1980, at 10.
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